March 16, 2026 | Category: Investments
By Meir Statman, Ph.D.
Source: Avantis® Investors
It’s important to recognize when luck and randomness, not just skill, influence outcomes in life and investing.
Hindsight errors can cause us to misjudge past choices, seeing good results as proof of skill and bad results as mistakes.
Learning to spot and avoid hindsight bias can lead to more realistic expectations and better long-term investment results.
“Don’t gamble,” Will Rogers said. “Take all your savings and buy some good stock and hold it till it goes up, then sell it. If it don’t go up, don’t buy it.”1
The psychologist Baruch Fischhoff, who introduced us to hindsight shortcuts and errors, wrote, “In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight. … People believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than they actually did. They even misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what they knew in foresight.”2
Hindsight errors are the belief that whatever happened was bound to happen, as if uncertainty and chance were banished from the world. So, if an introverted man marries a shy woman, it must be because, as we have known all along, “birds of a feather flock together,” and if he marries an outgoing woman, it must be because, as we have known all along, “opposites attract.”
Similarly, if stock prices decline after a prolonged rise, it must be, as we have known all along, that “trees don’t grow to the sky,” and if stock prices continue to rise, it must be, as we have equally known all along, “the trend is your friend.”
Hindsight errors are a serious problem for all historians, including stock market historians. Once an event is part of history, there is a tendency to see the sequence that led to it as inevitable. In hindsight, poor choices with happy endings are described as brilliant choices, and unhappy endings of well-considered choices are attributed to horrendous choices.
Yet not all hindsight is about errors. Indeed, good hindsight shortcuts serve as good instructors, teaching us to repeat actions that brought good outcomes and avoid actions that brought bad ones. We studied for exams and aced them. We learned that acing exams is the likely outcome of studying for exams.
Hindsight shortcuts are always precise when one-to-one associations exist between past and future events, actions and outcomes, and causes and consequences. However, hindsight shortcuts can easily turn into hindsight errors where randomness and luck are prominent, loosening associations between past events and future events, actions and outcomes, and causes and consequences.
Hindsight errors might arise from unawareness of the influence of randomness and luck or from a desire to see the world as predictable, devoid of randomness or luck.
We ace an exam without studying when luck is good and exam questions match whatever we remember from the few classes we attended. But when luck is bad, we fail the exam and perhaps the course. Hindsight errors can mislead lucky students into thinking that they can ace exams without studying and can mislead unlucky students into thinking that studying for exams is futile.
In a 2017 The Wall Street Journal article, I noted the need for diversification because of the difficulty of identifying winning investments in foresight.4 A reader objected. “Look at it this way,” he wrote. “Start with 10 funds to choose from,” and “weed out at least half of the managers as poor performers. … Now select the ‘average’ from among those left … and you’ll end up in the top quartile and beat the market.”
Another reader, however, noted the error of hindsight. “Do you drive your car by looking through the windshield or the rear-view mirror?”
An adviser shared with me a method she uses to correct clients’ hindsight errors. At the first meeting each year, she asks clients questions about the coming year and asks them to make forecasts. The questions are along the lines of the following:
At the end-of-the-year meeting, clients might be tempted by hindsight to bring up forecasts that came true: “Why did you hold any weight in small-caps when we knew with foresight that large-caps would outperform?” or “Why didn’t you invest more of my money in international stock funds when we could clearly see the signs that they were ready to have a better year than U.S. stock funds?”
At that point, the adviser will take out the list and educate her clients about the difference between hindsight and foresight and the pitfalls of hindsight errors.
Sources:
1Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, updated with new commentary by Jason Zweig (New York: Harper Business Essentials, 2003), 368.
2Baruch Fischhoff, “Debiasing,” in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Shortcuts and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 422–44.
3Robyn A. LeBoeuf and Michael I. Norton, “Consequence-Cause Matching: Looking to the Consequences of Events to Infer Their Causes,” Journal of Consumer Research 39, No. 1 (June 2012): 128–41.
4Meir Statman, “A Different Kind of Financial-Literacy Test,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2017.
Copyright 2026 American Century Proprietary Holdings Inc. All rights reserved.
The content of this material has been prepared for informational purposes and does not constitute tax, legal, or accounting advice. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, its subsidiaries, and/or affiliates do not provide tax, legal, or accounting advisory services.
The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of Avantis® Investors. This information is for educational purposes only and is not intended as investment advice. Popular Securities is not affiliated with the article contained in this communication and makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of the content contained therein. Neither the information nor the opinions expressed constitute a solicitation by Popular Securities, LLC for the retention, purchase, or sale of securities.
Avantis® Investors and Popular Securities, LLC. are separate and unaffiliated firms, and neither is responsible for the products or services of the other. The views and opinions expressed are for informational and educational purposes only as of the date of writing and may change at any time based on market or other conditions and may not come to pass. This material is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice or recommendations, does not constitute a solicitation to buy or sell securities and should not be considered specific legal, investment or tax advice.
Investment products and services are offered by Popular Securities, LLC, a registered broker/dealer, member of FINRA and SIPC. Investment advisory services are offered through Popular Securities, LLC, a registered investment advisor. Popular Securities, LLC is a subsidiary of Popular, Inc. and an affiliate of Banco Popular de Puerto Rico. Popular Inc. and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico are not registered broker-dealers, nor registered investment advisors. Popular One is an integrated financial services platform that revolves around you through which Popular Securities services are offered. Investment products are not FDIC insured, are not deposits or obligations of, nor guaranteed by Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, its affiliates and/or subsidiaries; they involve risk and may lose value, including the loss of the principal invested.